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**BONN CLIMATE NEWS UPDATE**  
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## Climate talks take place amidst world in turmoil

Bonn, 16 June (Prerna Bomzan and Meena Raman) - The 62<sup>nd</sup> sessions of the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) are convening in Bonn, Germany, from 16 to 26 June 2025, presided over by SBI Chair **Julia Gardiner (Australia)** and SBSTA Chair **Adonia Ayebare (Uganda)**. The intersessional meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) will advance work on the decisions adopted last year in Baku, under the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP), the Conference of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) and the Conference of Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA), paving the way for the next set of decisions to be taken at the annual climate talks ('COP 30'), scheduled in November this year, in Belém, Brazil.

The Bonn talks are taking place against the backdrop of much turmoil on many fronts – from having experienced the “ten warmest years on record” as recently [reported](#) by the World Meteorological Organisation, with a “70% chance that 5-year average warming for 2025-2029 will be more than 1.5°C”, to a chaotic world order with full-on assault on “multilateralism” and “international cooperation” unleashed by the current **United States (US)** Trump Presidency with an on-going “tariff” war on the trade and economic front, to an utter failure by governments

to stop the continued crimes against humanity in Gaza and the West Bank committed with naked impunity in violation of international law. economic front, to an utter failure by governments to stop the continued crimes against humanity in Gaza and the West Bank committed with naked impunity in violation of international law.

With 2025 marking the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Paris Agreement (PA), we ironically see the largest historical and current per capita emitter, the **US**, pulling out of its multilateral commitments, and going rogue with continued fossil fuel expansion. Also, the climate agenda in many developed countries is on the back-burner as they continue with their fossil fuel expansion, turning their backs on their “historical responsibility” and their legal obligations to pay back the climate debt owed to developing countries and the peoples of the global South. Many major developed countries are diverting their financial resources to military spending and defence, instead of providing more funds for climate finance and development assistant.

In the aftermath of a [weak decision](#) adopted last year at COP 29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, on the new collective quantified goal ([NCOG](#)) on climate

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finance for developing countries, (assailed by many as an “insult” and a “joke” on developing countries), there is more than ever, an urgent need for genuine multilateralism, international cooperation and good faith to deliver on climate action and support, remaining true to the commitments made under the UNFCCC’s climate regime.

On 6 June, the SB Chairs released a [joint note](#) giving an overview of their proposed approach to the Bonn sessions, expressing commitment to support Parties in “swiftly advancing mandated technical work across the extensive agendas of the SBs, in concluding work where possible and in laying the groundwork for the delivery of robust outcomes” at COP 30.

Meanwhile, the incoming COP 30 Brazilian Presidency’s [third letter to Parties of 23 May](#), underlined its priority “to reinforce multilateralism and the climate change regime under the UNFCCC” and, in Bonn, it will be convening a “day zero” of informal consultations with heads of delegations (HoDs) of Parties on 15 June, a day prior to the opening of the official talks. The letter states, “We invite HoDs to engage in constructive and substantive exchanges to help catalyze progress on outstanding negotiating issues. Special focus will be given to: (i) the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) indicators under the UAE–Belém Work Programme, (ii) the UAE Dialogue on implementing the GST (global stocktake) outcomes, and (iii) the UAE Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP)”.

Some of the key issues in the spotlight at SB 62 are set out below.

## ADOPTION OF PROVISIONAL AGENDAS

In the supplementary provisional agendas of the SBs dated 5 June, two new matters have been included at the request from **Bolivia**, for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, viz. (i) [“Implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement”](#) on the mandatory obligations of provision of finance by developed to developing countries, and on (ii) [“Promoting international cooperation and addressing the concerns with climate change-related trade-restrictive unilateral measures”](#) (which include carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) adopted by the

**European Union [EU]**, and similar proposals by the **United Kingdom (UK)** and **Canada**.) How these two proposed agenda items will be treated by the SB Chairs for adoption will be closely watched, given that they are likely to be contested by developed countries on the opening day on 16 June.

## MATTERS RELATING TO ADAPTATION

This year is very significant for adaptation related items. There are five agenda items under adaptation: (i) GGA, (ii) National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), (iii) the Nairobi work programme, (iv) review of the Adaptation Committee and (v) guidance relating to Adaptation Communications.

At COP 29 in Baku, by decision [3/CMA.6](#), there were some gains made with a substantive outcome under the GGA, in particular, to have the GGA as a “*standing agenda item*”, with the adoption of the ‘*Baku Adaptation Roadmap*’ to advance the GGA work under the ‘*UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience*’; and the inclusion of “*means of implementation*” in the UAE–Belém work programme on the development of indicators, for measuring progress achieved towards the GGA’s seven thematic and four dimensional targets. These were key demands by developing countries. (The GGA thematic targets cover water, food and agriculture, health, ecosystems and biodiversity, infrastructure and human settlements, poverty eradication and livelihoods and protection of cultural heritage, while the dimensional targets are (i) impact, vulnerability and risk assessment, (ii) planning, (iii) implementation and (iv) monitoring, evaluation and learning. )

However, huge gaps remained on the rest of the adaptation agenda items, especially on the very important issue of NAPs, with only a procedural decision to continue further work at SB 62. The NAPs agenda has seen a history of stalled negotiations due to fundamental divergences between developing and developed countries over anchoring means of implementation in the decision, consistently blocked by developed countries led by the **US**. (See [TWN Update](#))

### *GGA: UAE–Belém work programme on indicators*

In Bonn, the most critical GGA issue is the progress of work on the development of indicators under the

UAE-Belem work programme which is seen as a key COP 30 outcome.

Paragraphs 26-27 of decision [3/CMA.6](#) from Baku last year, requested the SB Chairs: to invite the technical experts to commence their work on further refining the indicators, addressing gaps and developing new indicators, produce a consolidated list of indicator options for Parties and a progress report to be published before SB 62; finalise and submit their inputs to the technical reports, including recommendations on the indicators, to be published by the secretariat prior to the workshop to be held in conjunction with SB 62; and the secretariat to publish the outputs prior to SB 62.

The [progress report](#) by the technical experts published on 23 May, contains the link to the [consolidated list of indicator options](#) for consideration at SB 62, which now comprises a total of “490 indicators”, down from over 9000 in the pre-CMA 6 mapping. It also provides an update on the technical work undertaken on the indicators since CMA 6, which includes the expert’s [reports](#) on the thematic and dimensional targets, and the [summary report](#) of the mandated workshop conducted on [21-22 March](#) this year. The [technical report](#) covering the work of experts since CMA 6 and May 2025, provides an overview of the challenges and gaps identified by the experts, as well as their suggestions on way forward.

Negotiations in Bonn will centre around the critical issue of addressing the huge number of “490” indicators contained in the expert’s consolidated list, given paragraph 20 of decision [3/CMA.6](#), which noted the “*need to avoid an additional reporting burden on Parties*” and decided that the final outcome of the work programme “*may include a manageable set of no more than 100 indicators*”.

The next steps of advancing work during the intersessional period between SB 62 and CMA 7 will also be an aspect of the discussions. In terms of the quality of indicators, a potential debate could ensue on the “means of implementation” (MOI) indicators - whether they will truly reflect the UNFCCC principles and provisions of delivery of MOI from developed to developing countries. There will also be a mandated hybrid workshop to take stock of the progress of work on the indicators

by technical experts that will be held on the first day of the talks on 16 June. The [concept note](#) provides the approach and the proposed agenda of the workshop.

### ***GGA: Baku Adaptation Roadmap***

The other key issue is to advance work to “*develop the modalities*” of the adopted ‘*Baku Adaptation Roadmap*’ which aims to advance progress in line with Article 7.1 of the PA and support the implementation of the elements of paragraph 38 of decision [2/CMA.5](#) which adopted the ‘*UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience*’ to guide the achievement of the GGA. Submissions on the roadmap can be found at the UNFCCC [submission portal](#).

### ***GGA: Transformational adaptation***

In Dubai in 2023, in relation to the GGA, via decision 2/CMA 5, (para 46) a request was made to the secretariat “*to undertake work to examine how transformational adaptation is defined and understood at different spatial scales and sectors, and how progress in planning and implementing transformational adaptation approaches might be assessed at the global level,*” for consideration in Baku at CMA 6. However, many Parties were not ready to discuss this matter, given the complexity of the technical paper prepared by the secretariat and its late submission. At CMA 6, Parties took note of the [technical paper](#) on transformational adaptation and requested the SBs to continue consideration of this matter at SB 62. The secretariat was also tasked “*to prepare a reader-friendly summary*” of the technical paper, which was [published](#) in April. In Bonn, how this matter will advance will have to be seen.

### ***National Adaptation Plans (NAPs)***

With only a [procedural decision](#) adopted in Baku, requesting SBI 62 to continue consideration on the matter on the basis of the “non consensus” [draft text](#) with a view to recommending a “*draft decision*” for consideration and adoption by COP 30, negotiations in Bonn are expected to be difficult, given the dogged stance of developed countries to exclude addressing the MOI for the formulation and implementation of the NAPs of developing countries. Whether this obstinate stance of the

developed countries will change remains to be seen.

## JUST TRANSITION WORK PROGRAMME (JTWP)

At COP 29 in Baku, with no consensus on the [draft Presidency text](#), only a procedural decision was announced at the closing plenary, to continue consideration of the matter at SB 62 with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by CMA 7 in Belem. The bone of contention is over the “scope” of the work programme with divergences between developed and developing countries – the former pursuing efforts to narrow the scope, contrary to the broad elements contained in paragraph 2 of decision [3/CMA.5](#), which was warded off by developing countries in Baku. (Developed countries want the focus to be mainly about the workforce in relation to the energy transition, while developing countries insist on a focus covering all dimensions including mitigation, adaptation, sustainable development and poverty eradication as well as international cooperation as an enabler of just transition pathways to achieve the PA goals).

The failure to arrive at a substantive outcome was the result of an “imbalanced text” by the Co-chairs of the JTWP which did not reflect the concerns and proposals of developing countries and was viewed as narrowing the scope of the JTWP. Developed countries in the JTWP consultations, also wanted to delete references in the draft Presidency text to the Convention, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities [CBDR-RC], and the concept of the ‘right to development’, drawing strong reactions from developing countries. (See [TWN Update](#)).

With regard to the mandated [third global dialogue](#) that was held from 22-23 May in Panama City, Panama, the focus was on ‘Approaches to enhancing adaptation and climate resilience in the context of just transitions’. The [concept note](#) for the dialogue covered a detailed agenda with discussion rounds focused on peoples and communities, economic drivers and workforce, enabling systems and protection, climate finance and international cooperation, innovation and technology transfer, capacity building and knowledge sharing, building on synergies under and outside the UNFCCC process, identifying concrete and actionable

outcomes for the JTWP.

At SB 62, how the JTWP will advance work will be closely watched, and what the starting point of the negotiations will be, remains to be seen.

## GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

There are three agenda items under the global stocktake (GST), stemming from the outcomes of the first GST adopted by decision [1/CMA.5](#) at COP 28 in Dubai, namely: (i) United Arab Emirates (UAE) dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes, referred to in paragraphs 97 and 98 of the decision, (ii) the annual GST dialogue and its report, referred to in paragraph 187 of the decision and (iii) refinement of GST process referred to in paragraph 192 of the decision.

At COP 29 in Baku, there was no consensus on all three matters. Rule 16 of the UNFCCC’s draft Rules of Procedure was applied to the UAE dialogue and the annual GST dialogue. (Rule 16 provides that any agenda item whose consideration is not completed “*shall be included automatically*” in the agenda for the next session, unless decided by the COP). On the refinement of the GST process, a procedural decision was adopted to continue negotiations at SB 62 in Bonn based on the informal note by the co-facilitators in Baku. (See [TWN Update](#))

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE) DIALOGUE

Paragraph 97 of the first GST decision was under the ‘Finance’ heading of the ‘Means of implementation and support’ section, where it was decided to “*establish the UAE dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes*”. Further, paragraph 98 also decided that the UAE dialogue will be operationalised starting from CMA 6 (2024) and conclude at CMA 10 (2028), requesting the SBI 60 to “develop modalities for the dialogue” for consideration by CMA 6.

Since SBI 60, negotiations have proven very controversial and difficult with persistent [divergences over the “scope”](#) of the dialogue – notably, whether the focus should be on implementation of the “finance” related elements of the GST outcomes or whether there should be a wider focus covering implementation of “all



elements” of the GST outcomes, mainly driven by developed countries who want a focus on “paragraph 28” of the GST decision containing the language on *“transitioning away from fossil fuels”*.

At COP 29 in Baku, the [draft decision text proposed by the Presidency](#) for final consideration, did not see consensus. This was so, despite protracted negotiations that saw huge concessions by some Parties to accommodate the broad scope to *“consist of parallel tracks on the implementation of the outcomes of the first GST, covering mitigation and adaptation, as well as the identification of opportunities in finance, capacity-building, and technology development and transfer as key enablers”*. The delicate draft decision proposed was rejected by some Parties led by developed countries at the closing plenary due to the absence of any reference to the preparation of an “annual report” in the decision text, which proponents saw as a means of “tracking” the implementation of the GST outcomes, particularly the implementation of “paragraph 28” of the GST decision.

At SB 62, Parties will have to decide on the way forward on this matter. Whether the draft decision text by the COP 29 Presidency from Baku could be a starting point for further negotiations remains to be seen.

## ANNUAL GST DIALOGUE

Paragraph 187 of the first GST decision under the ‘Guidance and way forward’ section requests the SB Chairs to *“organise an annual GST dialogue”, “to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and good practices on how the outcomes of the GST are informing the preparation of Parties’ next nationally determined contributions (NDCs) in accordance with the relevant provisions of the PA”, and also requests the secretariat to prepare a report for consideration at its subsequent session”*.

At COP 29 in Baku, “Rule 16” was applied to the [report](#) of the 2024 [first annual GST dialogue](#) held during SB 60, with the [draft text](#) reflecting contestations over whether there should be key messages and substantive elements drawn from the summary report prepared by the secretariat, the timing of subsequent dialogues, and whether there should be a continuation or termination of the dialogue itself.

On 30 April, the SB Chairs conducted [virtual informal consultations](#) to discuss the organisation, topics, and summary report of the second annual GST dialogue, which basically saw positions of Parties and their groups remain intact, as reflected in the proceedings contained in the SB Chairs’ [concept note](#) which also lays out the organisation of the second dialogue – which is specifically titled the second GST “NDC” dialogue, and is scheduled on 19-20 June, open to all Parties and non-Party stakeholders.

## REFINEMENT OF OVERALL GST PROCESS

The first GST took place in Dubai at COP 28 in 2023. The second GST will need to conclude in 2028, with the process for inputs commencing in 2026 and the technical assessment taking place from 2027 to 2028.

Paragraph 192 of the first GST decision under the ‘Guidance and way forward’ section, decided that *“consideration of refining the procedural and logistical elements of the overall global stocktake process on the basis of experience gained from the first global stocktake”* shall commence at SB 60 and conclude at CMA 6. With only a procedural CMA 6 decision reached in Baku to continue consideration of the matter at SB 62 based on the “non-consensus” [informal note](#) by the co-facilitators, the Bonn negotiations will revisit the most contested issues captured in the annex to the informal note, which deals with the preparation of inputs, technical assessment and consideration of outputs. One sticky issue is over the inputs to be provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in relation to its Seventh Assessment Report which is currently under preparation.

## MATTERS RELATED TO FINANCE

The joint COP 29 and incoming COP 30 Presidencies will convene open consultations with Parties and non-Party stakeholders on the *“Baku to Belem Roadmap on 1.3 T”* referred to in paragraph 27 of NCQG decision [1/CMA.6](#) in relation to the aspirational target of scaling up of financing to developing countries to *“at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035”* contained in paragraph 7 of the decision. This will be a closely watched process on how this “scaling up of finance” will happen. The

Presidencies are expected to produce a report at COP 30.

There are also two mandated events relating to finance in Bonn: (i) First workshop in 2025 under the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue on Article 2.1(c) of the PA and its complementarity with Article 9, and (ii) the third biennial in-session workshop on information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9.5 of the PA. (Article 2.1 (c) relates to making “finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient development”, while Article 9 in general refers to the obligations related to the provision and mobilisation of finance for developing countries and Article 9.5 requires developed countries to biennially communicate indicative information about their financial resources to developing countries.)

The other important matter is in relation to the Adaptation Fund. In Baku, decision [2/CMP.19](#) and decision [13/CMA.6](#) requested SBI 62 to consider the matter of the arrangements for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the PA and to make recommendations on this matter for consideration at CMP 20 and CMA 7, respectively in Belem.

### *First Workshop on Article 2.1(c) in 2025*

In Dubai, by decision [9/CMA.5](#), Parties decided to continue and strengthen the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue in 2024 and 2025 to exchange views on and enhance understanding of the scope of Article 2.1 (c) of the PA and its complementarity with Article 9, including with regard to its operationalisation and implementation. Negotiations in Dubai revealed that there was no common understanding among developed and developing countries on Article 2.1(c).

In their [message](#) of 30 April, Co-Chairs **Mohamed Nasr (Egypt)** and **Gabriela Blatter (Switzerland)**, identified the overarching themes for the two mandated workshops in 2025 stating that they have been selected with the “aim of fostering inclusive, concrete, and solutions-oriented deliberations under the dialogue among Parties and stakeholders, with a view to supporting the ability of CMA 7 to deciding on a way forward with regard to its deliberations on this matter”.

The themes are as follows: (i) first workshop on ‘Different approaches to Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9 in diverse contexts’ (ii) second workshop on ‘Article 2.1(c) of the PA and its complementarity with Article 9, after ten years of the PA and three years of the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue’. The [first workshop](#) is scheduled on 17-18 June, with the overarching theme of ‘Different approaches to Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9 in diverse contexts’.

### *Workshop on Article 9.5*

The [third biennial workshop](#) on 20 June, led by co-facilitators **Elena Pereira (Honduras)** and **Solomon Schonfield (UK)**, aims to: (i) Enhance thoughts on opportunities, challenges, and lessons learned from the information contained in the third biennial communications, (ii) Identify insights on the overall state of predictability and clarity of ex-ante information on financial support to developing countries for the implementation of the PA based on the lessons learned from the third biennial communications, and (iii) discuss how information in biennial communications can be conducive to measuring progress on efforts related to climate finance through the global stocktake.

The [provisional agenda](#) of the workshop also has a session on identifying elements for political consideration, inviting sharing of views on aspects that require political guidance, including at the third high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance to be held at CMA 7. The deliberations of the workshop will be reflected in a summary report prepared by the secretariat for consideration by COP 30 and CMA 7.

### *“Baku to Bélem Roadmap on 1.3 T” – COP 29 and COP 30 Presidency Consultations*

Paragraph 27 of NCQG decision [1/CMA.6](#) launched the “Baku to Belem Roadmap on 1.3 T”, under the joint Presidencies, aiming at “*scaling up climate finance to developing country Parties to support low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development pathways and implement the NDCs and NAPs including through grants, concessional and nondebt creating instruments, and measures to create fiscal space, taking into account relevant multilateral initiatives as appropriate; and requests*

*the Presidencies to produce a report summarising the work as they conclude the work*" by CMA 7 in Belem. The Roadmap is in relation to the aspirational target of scaling up of financing to developing countries to *"at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035"* contained in paragraph 7 of the decision.

In response to the mandate, the joint Presidencies invited [submissions](#) on the overall expectations for the Roadmap, and also convened virtual consultations on 4 March. In their [message](#) of 13 May, the two Presidencies shared a [work plan](#) outlining the approach, and timeline, milestones and outputs, of the Roadmap. The next key milestones are as follows: publish the draft Roadmap for consultation on 8 September; publish Roadmap and Presidencies report on 27 October; and the high-level launch event of Roadmap at CMA 7. In Bonn, consultations with Parties is scheduled on 16 June and with non-Party stakeholders on 19 June.

### ***Matters related to the Adaptation Fund***

In Baku, decision [2/CMP.19](#) and decision [13/CMA.6](#) requested SBI 62 to consider the matter of the arrangements for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement and to make recommendations on this matter for consideration at CMP 20 and CMA 7, respectively. By decisions [1/CMP.14](#) and [13/CMA.1](#), the Adaptation Fund shall exclusively serve the PA once the share of proceeds under Article 6.4 of the PA becomes available. (It was agreed under the PA that a share of proceeds from the Article 6.4 carbon-market mechanism will be forwarded to the Adaptation Fund.)

Given the governance of the Adaptation Fund is currently only under the CMP (meeting of the Kyoto Protocol Parties), governed by decision [1/CMP.3](#) including trustee agreement with the World Bank, there is the urgent need for the CMA (meeting of PA Parties) to mandate the Adaptation Fund Board to conclude a new trustee agreement with the World Bank for the monetisation of the Article 6.4 share of proceeds, in order for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the PA. The inclusion of this critical issue in the agenda item in Bonn is being led by the **African Group**, to address the governance issue of the

Adaptation Fund under the PA by CMA 7 in Belem.

### **MITIGATION WORK PROGRAMME**

CMA 4 decided that at least two global dialogues and investment focused events will be held each year as part of the 'Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme' (MWP). In 2025, the newly appointed Co-Chairs, **Angela Churie Kallhauge (Sweden)** and **Gao Xiang (China)** (after consultations with Parties), decided that the dialogues this year will focus on the topic **"Enabling mitigation solutions in the industry, AFOLU (agriculture, forestry, and other land uses) and waste sectors, drawing on national and regional experience"**. A two-day event was held in Panama City from 19<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup> May, 2025. During this session, Parties discussed the topic **'Enabling mitigation solutions in the forest sector, drawing on national and regional experience'**. A report of the session is to be prepared by the Co-Chairs later in the year.

At SB 62, Parties are expected to discuss further steps to be taken under the MWP. Some Parties led by developed countries are unhappy that the MWP has not been able to be the vehicle to implement the outcomes from the first GST through "high level messages", especially those relating to paragraph 28 (on global mitigation efforts in relation to energy, including the transitioning away from fossil fuels).

In Baku, the MWP decision also took note of the proposal made by **Brazil** on behalf of **Group SUR** for the creation of a digital platform for facilitating the implementation of mitigation and invited submissions from Parties to share their views on the design and features of this platform.

Parties are to discuss the digital platform in Bonn, and it can be expected that some Parties may raise the issue of how this proposal relates to the **Article 6.8 web-based platform** on non-market approaches (NMA Platform), which was advanced by the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)**, and is designed to promote cooperation among Parties in supporting the implementation of their NDCs, including on mitigation and adaptation efforts. The NMA platform is supposed to also include information on finance, technology and

capacity-building support available or provided for these initiatives.

non-market approaches under Article 6.8 of the PA is also on the agenda of the SBSTA to advance further work.)

(The work programme under the framework for